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UNIQUE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF HIV-INFECTED
WOMEN INMATES: WHAT SERVICES ARE REQUIRED
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT?
CONNIE M. MAYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The'Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began receiving reports
about a condition eventually known as Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) in 1981.1 By 1983, scientists had identified a new
human retrovirus called HIV, or Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
that was responsible for AIDS.' Since that time, the number of
persons with HIV infection and AIDS has grown, and HIV/AIDS
now affects nearly every country in the world.3 Between the start
of the epidemic and July 1996, an estimated 27.9 million persons
across the world were living with HIV infection.4
HIV infection has been prevalent in women from the onset of
the epidemic.' The CDC received the first report of a woman
infected with HIV in 1981.6 By August of 1992, women in the
United States represented 10.4% of the total epidemic.' HIV is now
the third leading cause of death in American women between the
ages of twenty-five and forty-four.' In spite of the fact that women
have been infected with HIV from the very beginning of the AIDS
epidemic, commentators did not focus their attention on the unique
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1. See Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia--Los Angeles, 30
MORBDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 250, 251 (1981); Centers for Disease Control, Kaposi's
Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia among Homosexual Men-New York City and
California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 305, 305-06 (1981).
2. See JOYCE W. HoPP & ELIZABETH A. ROGERS, AIDS AND THE ALLIED HEALTH
PROFESSIONS 5-6 (1989).
3. See id. at 2.
4. See AIDSCAP/FAMILY HEALTH INTERNATIONAL, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
FINAL REPORT: THE STATUS AND TRENDS OF THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC 5 (1996).
5. See James Chin, Current and Future Dimensions of the HIVIAIDS Pandemic in
Women and Children, 336 LANCET 221, 224 (1991).
6. See HOPP & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 4.
7. See Mary E. Guinan, HIV, Heterosexual Transmission, and Women, 268 JAMA 520,
521 (1992).
8. See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection
among Persons Aged 25-44 Years-United States, 1994, 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 121, 121 (1996).
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needs of women living with HIV until the second decade of the
epidemic.9 Early understanding of HIV disease progression in
women was often in the context of studying some other group, such
as infants, rather than targeting women as a distinct group for
study.'0 Many studies about women targeted only pregnant women,
and researchers did not attempt to understand the disease in
women, generally, until relatively recently. Despite these delays,
recent studies have found that HIV-infected women do have mental
health needs that are different from the needs of other groups
infected with the AIDS virus.'
Women with HIV infection who are incarcerated have the same
mental health needs as other infected women. 2 In addition,
incarcerated women are subject to other stressors related to the
conditions and reality of confinement that may serve to exacerbate
the mental health problems related to HIV. 3 As a result, and given
the high rate of HIV infection among women prisoners, 4 the needs
of HIV-infected women inmates are an enormous problem for
correctional facilities.
The incidence of AIDS is fourteen times higher in our state and
federal correctional facilities than in the general population." In
some states, the number of HIV-infected inmates may be as high as
17% of the overall prison population.'" Moreover, in many systems,
women inmates are infected at a much higher percentage. For
example, recent statistics indicate that 20.5% of female inmates in
New York are infected with HIV while only 11% of the male
inmates are HIV-positive. 7
To complicate the situation, prisons must understand that
women inmates who are infected with HIV have mental health
needs that are different from their male counterparts. The limited
programs offered in men's correctional facilities are not necessarily
appropriate to meet the needs of female inmates. The question,
then, is whether prisons are legally required to address these
mental health needs.
9. See Lorraine Sherr, Psychosocial Aspects of Providing Care for Women with HIV
Infection, in HIV INFECTION IN WOMEN 107, 107 (Howard Minkoff et al. eds., 1995).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 109-14.
12. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
14. See Elizabeth Kantor, AIDS and HIV Infection in Prisoners, in THE AIDS
KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.8-1, 1.8-1 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
15. See id.
16. See THEODORE M. HAMMETT ET AL., NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, 1992 UPDATE:
HIV/AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 13-19 (1994).
17. See id. at 22.
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This Article outlines the unique mental health needs of HIV-
infected female inmates, including the types of mental health
intervention shown to be effective in treating HIV-related
neuropsychological disturbances. Additionally, this Article explores
the type of prison mental health services that are mandated to be
provided by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which guarantees that prisoners be free from cruel and
unusual punishment."8 This Article further discusses the possible
impact of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,' 9 in
which the Supreme Court recently held that the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to state prison systems.20 Finally,
this Article discusses how prisons will likely have to respond to the
mental health needs of HIV-positive female inmates in order to be
in compliance with the requirements of both the ADA and the
Eighth Amendment.
II. PREVALENCE OF HIV/AIDS AMONG WOMEN INMATES
During 1994, state, local, and territorial health departments
reported 80,691 cases of full-blown AIDS within the general
population. 21 Although approximately 441,500 cumulative AIDS
cases have been reported since 1981, it is estimated that ten times
the number of persons reporting full blown AIDS are HIV-positive.22
The incidence of AIDS is fourteen times higher in state and
federal prisons than in the general United States population.23
Prisoners are at exceptional risk for infection with HIV, in part
because of the connection between drug use and imprisonment.
During the late 1980's and early 1990's, eighteen states doubled or
tripled their prison populations primarily because the central
strategy of the United States government's "war on drugs" has been
incarceration.2 4 In its 1991 report, the National Commission on
AIDS stated that:
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
20. See id. at 213.
21. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome-United States, 1994, 273 JAMA 692, 692 (1995).
22. See Mary E. Chamberland & Harold W. Jaffee, The Epidemiology of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, in HIV
INFECTION AND DISEASE 47, 48 (Norman Rapoza ed., 1989).
23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, REPORT NUMBER FOUR: HIV DISEASE IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 6 (1991); Kantor, supra note 14, at 1.8-1.
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By choosing mass imprisonment as the federal and state
governments' response to the use of drugs, we have created a de
facto policy of incarcerating more and more individuals with
HIV infection. Under the present policy, the percentage of
federal prisoners who are drug offenders will rise by 1995 from
47 percent to 70 percent.25
From 1985 through 1997, the number of women incarcerated
increased by 265%, while the increase in the number of males
incarcerated rose 148%.26 The disproportionate increase in the
incarceration rate for women appears to be related to minimum
sentencing laws for low level drug offenders." Nationwide, the
number of women serving sentences for drug offenses accounts for
more than one-half of the total growth of the female inmate
population, while women incarcerated for other crimes account for
only one-fifth of that increase.28 In addition to being imprisoned for
drug use, women are also imprisoned for sexual activity,29 two of
the very behaviors that also make women at risk for HIV
infection.30 The attempt to "criminalize" AIDS through HIV-specific
criminal statutes has also added to the number of incarcerated
HIV-infected women.31
In the nation's prisons, a recent survey conducted by the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) indicates that correctional
facilities reported a cumulative total of 11,565 AIDS cases among
inmates in federal, state, and select city or county correctional
facilities as of March 1993.32 From 1985 through 1994, approxi-
mately 4,588 inmates died of HIV-related illnesses while in
custody.33 As of 1994, state and federal facilities housed around one
million inmates, of which approximately 2.3%, or 23,000, were
25. NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, supra note 24, at 6.
26. See DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1997 4-6 (1998).
27. See TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON
INMATES: WOMEN IN PRISON 1 (1994).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 3.
30. See Kantor, supra note 14, at 1.8-1.
31. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1997) (criminalizing the act of exposing
another person to HIV); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1998) (criminalizing any intentional infecting
of another person with HIV); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 1996) (criminalizing any
knowing attempt to infect another person with HIV); OKLA STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West
Supp. 1999) (criminalizing any knowing conduct reasonably likely to transfer HIV to another
person).
32. See HAMMETT ETAL., supra note 16, at 14.
33. See THEODORE M. HAMMETT ET AL., NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, 1994 UPDATE:
HIV/AIDS AND STDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 4 (1995).
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estimated to be HIV-positive.' Some states reported a percentage
as high as 17-20% (New York) and others as low as 0-1% (Oregon)."5
In the New York system alone, it was estimated that approximately
6,000 of the state's 54,000 inmates were HIV-positive.3 6
Incarcerated women are disproportionately affected by HIV as
compared to incarcerated men. In fact, in 1994, aggregate rates of
AIDS in state and federal prison systems for women were double
the rates for men." In New York, for example, blinded studies
indicated that 20.3% of the females, as compared to only 11.5% of
the male inmates, tested HIV-positive. 8 More recently, in Massa-
chusetts, though women account for only 7% of the inmates who are
incarcerated, they represented 20% of the HIV-positive inmates. 9
Additionally, women of color are disproportionately affected by
HIV/AIDS. About 20% of women in the U.S. are black or Hispanic,
but almost half (47%) of all female AIDS cases have occurred in
these groups: 30% among blacks and 17% among Hispanics."' The
disproportion of HIV-positive women of color in correctional
facilities corresponds to the high prevalence of HIV in women of
color nationwide.4' For example, in Massachusetts nearly half of all
HIV-positive incarcerated women are women of color. 2
As demonstrated by the NIJ survey, the number of inmates
suffering from HIV infection is large and growing. The number of
female inmates with HIV is rising at an even greater rate.4
Females have historically been under-served in correctional
facilities due to their small numbers." Their needs with regard to
mental health services are different from male inmates and prison
systems need to consider how to address these differences. For
example, women more often than men may have dependent minor
children for whom they are solely responsible, and immediate
decisions about future care and custody of those children must be
34. See HAMMETT ETAL., supra note 16, at 15-26.
35. See id. at 22-24.
36. See id. at 22.
37. See id. at 14.
38. See id. at 22.
39. See Anne S. De Groot et al., Setting the Standard for Care: HIV Risk Exposures and
Clinical Manifestations of HIV in Incarcerated Massachusetts Women, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 353, 360 (1998).
40. See HAMMETrETAL., supra note 16, at 13.
41. See De Groot et al., supra note 39, at 360-61, 381.
42. See id. at 358-61.
43. See id. at 358-59.
44. See Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1551 (D. Ariz. 1993) (stating that fewer mental
health services were provided for women prisoners because there were fewer women than
men in the prison system).
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made. Additionally, women have many unique emotional issues
surrounding reproduction, child rearing, and their roles within the
family.
45
To analyze what mental health services prisons are required to
provide to HIV-positive female inmates, the next section explores
the common neuropsychological problems associated with H1V in
women and what interventions are recommended to address those
problems. These needs are exacerbated by the isolation experienced
in a correctional facility. The proposed treatments, while available
in the free world, are often not available behind prison walls for a
variety of reasons, including cost, lack of adequate staffing, and
perceived security issues. It is necessary to understand these
problems in order to determine what services prisons are required
to provide under the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
III. MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF WOMEN LIVING WITH HIV
INFECTION AND RECOMMENDED TREATMENT
Women who are HIV-positive have special mental health needs.
They experience a range of psychological problems, some of which
are symptoms specifically related to HIV/AIDS.46 Women living
with AIDS may experience the same psychological reactions as
those experienced by other terminally ill patients-disbelief, denial,
numbness, anger, depression, and suicidal ideation.47 Yet unlike
other terminal illnesses, such as cancer, a diagnosis of AIDS carries
with it the stigmatization and disapproval of an entire society. This
disapproval often results in social ostracism and discrimination
which create additional psychological stress.48 In addition to its
effect on psychology, most patients experience some cognitive and
affective changes related to HIV infection of the brain.49 Differenti-
ating between the effects of anxiety and depression on cognition and
45. See Sherr, supra note 9, at 110.
46. One study found that persons diagnosed with HIV experienced significantly higher
levels of depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive behavior than before their diagnosis.
See Joseph Ostrow et al., Disclosure of HIVAntibody Status: Behavioral and Mental Health
Correlates, 1 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 1 (1989); see also HOPP & ROGERS, supra note 2, at
134-45 (discussing dementia in AIDS patients); JON MUKAND, REHABILITATION FOR PATIENTS
WITH HlV DISEASE 234-38 (1991) (same); MARK WINIAKI, AIDS-RELATED PSYCHOTHERAPY
72-85 (1991) (noting the frequency of mood disorders in HIV-infected persons).
47. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 218.
48. See id. at 221.
49. See id. at 230.
19991 MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF HIV-INFECTED WOMEN INMATES 221
the effects of neurological problems on cognition is difficult but may
be crucial to proper diagnosis, intervention, and therapy.0
HIV-positive female inmates also may have to deal with
additional stigmatization and isolation within the prison setting.
Though there is a trend away from the practice, some prisons
continue to have segregated housing for inmates who are known to
be HIV-positive.51 Inmates also are sometimes excluded from
rehabilitation programs, support groups, and educational programs
due to their infection. 2 Prisoners are already cut off from familial
supports as a result of incarceration. This additional isolation and
lack of support systems within the prison may aggravate existing
mental health problems. These mental health problems may be
magnified further by the stress related to inmates' perception of
lack of control over their treatment and fear of not receiving
emergency care.
5 3
As described below, the mental health problems commonly
experienced by women living with AIDS include dementia, depres-
sion, anxiety and panic disorders, delirium, suicidal ideation, guilt,
and bereavement.'
A. Dementia
The most severe neuropsychological disorder related to HIV has
been termed AIDS dementia complex (ADC)."5 Though the
prevalence of ADC is not completely understood, it is generally
believed that approximately one-third of adults with AIDS eventu-
ally develop ADC.56 Dementia is characterized initially by cognitive
impairment causing disturbances in learning new information,
50. See id.
51. Mississippi's and Alabama's prison systems still maintain segregated housing and
programming for HIV-positive inmates. See HAMMETr ET AL., supra note 16, at 59. The
policies regarding segregation of HIV-positive inmates have been upheld by several courts.
See Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding Mississippi's segregation
policy); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding Alabama's
segregation policy). Interestingly, courts also have upheld the decision of systems not to
segregate HIV-positive inmates when those policies were challenged by HIV-negative
inmates. See Portee v. Tollison, 753 F. Supp. 184, 186-87 (D.S.C. 1990), affd, 929 F.2d 694
(4th Cir. 1991).
52. See HAMMETr ET AL., supra note 33, at 61.
53. See HAMMETTETAL., supra note 16, at 72.
54. See HOPP & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 134-45; MUKAND, supra note 46, at 218-23;
WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 72-85.
55. See Stuart A. Lipton & Howard E. Gendelman, Dementia Associated with the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 934, 934 (1995).
56. See id.
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attention span, and information processing."7 In the early stages of
ADC, subtle failure in memory and concentration may occur along
with an overall "slowness" in thinking.5 8 Fine and gross motor
skills, such as writing or walking, also may become less fluid. 9 At
this stage, a person with ADC may exhibit social withdrawal,
appear agitated or depressed, and experience anxiety or panic
attacks.60
As the illness progresses, a severe dementing syndrome can
occur.6 1 The person may become incoherent or psychotic, with
increased psychomotor retardation, aggressive outbursts, and
inappropriate behavior.62 Ultimately, the demented person becomes
bedridden and may suffer from severe lack of coordination and loss
of bladder and bowel control.63
The psychiatric manifestations that might accompany ADC are
depression, irritability, panic and anxiety attacks, paranoid
ideation, and suicidal tendencies. 64  Despite the overlapping
similarities between HIV-related cognitive changes and those more
purely "psychological" difficulties, cognitive changes due to HIV
infection of the brain are not usually present to the same extent and
in the same manner.65 Psychological assessment is imperative to
distinguish the diagnostic possibilities in order to plan properly the
best intervention.66
B. Depression
Though dementia is the most severe neuropsychological
disorder related to HIV, patients often experience emotional trauma
typified by anxiety and depression. In fact, mood disorders appear
to comprise the majority of psychiatric manifestations of HIV
infection. 7 Depressive reactions often lead from mild to severe
behavioral manifestations such as social withdrawal, mood swings,
and isolation.6' These may feed a vicious cycle of reactions when
social support is alienated, relationships are strained, and individu-
57. See IGOR GRANT & ALEX MARTIN, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF HIV INFECTION 7 (1994).
58. See'MUKAND, supra note 46, at 231.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 232.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 231-32; GRANT & MARTIN, supra note 57, at 7-8.
64. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 231.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 232.
67. See WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 72.
68. See id. at 73.
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als become isolated from possible avenues of benefit.69 Obviously,
women who are incarcerated are isolated from family support and
cut off from many of the social services in the outside world from
which they could benefit, thereby exacerbating their vulnerability
to depression.
An HIV diagnosis can trigger depression related to many issues
unique to women. 70 "Women are faced with the possibility of a
curtailed life span, of never having children, or of never seeing their
children grow up. Not having children inevitably denies them the
pleasures of the mothering role, companionship, and considerable
purpose and engagement in everyday life."7 ' Many women with
AIDS "have physical manifestations that mar their self-image, such
as severe weight loss, Kaposi's sarcoma lesions in visible places, or
hair loss associated with various treatments."72
Additionally, women who are incarcerated are cut off from
traditional roles that studies have shown improve their health. The
inability to fulfill these roles can lead to depression and deteriora-
tion of women's health generally. For example, considerable
research has been done on the impact of employment on the
physical and mental health of women.7" This research shows that
the "worker role" is generally rewarding for women.74 First,
employed women report better overall health and fewer symptoms
of psychological distress than non-employed women.75 Second, the
relationship between the role of partner and one's physical and
mental well-being is favorable to women. 76 The "partner role" is a
source of identity, social support, and self-esteem. 77 Finally, the
"mother role," generally defined by the presence of children at
home, also has a positive impact on the physical and mental well-
69. See Sherr, supra note 9, at 112.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Jacquie Aston & John Lavery, The Health of Women in Paid Employment:
Effects of Quality of Work Role, Social Support and Cynicism on Psychological and Physical
Well-Being, 20 WOMEN & HEALTH REV. 1, 2 (1993).
74. See id.
75. See id.; Sara Arber, Class, Paid Employment and Family Roles: Making Sense of
Structural Disadvantage, Gender and Health Status, 32 Soc. Scd. & MED. 425, 434 (1991);
Judith H. Hibbard & Clyde R. Pope, Women's Employment, Social Support and Mortality,
18 WOMEN & HEALTH REV. 119 (1992).
76. See Arber, supra note 75, at 434; Debra Froberg et al., Multiple Roles and Women's
Mental and Physical Health: What Have We Learned?, 11 WOMEN & HEALTH REV. 79, 83-84
(1986); Ingrid Waldron & Jerry A. Jacobs, Effects of Multiple Roles on Women's Health:
Evidence from a National Longitudinol Study, 15 WOMEN & HEALTH REv. 3, 13 (1989).
77. See Arber, supra note 75, at 429; Hibbard & Pope, supra note 75.
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being of women."8 Middle-aged women and younger women with
one or two children enjoy better health than other women.79 The
fact that women inmates cannot fulfill these roles because they are
incarcerated contributes to their depression in a way that is not
similarly felt by their male counterparts.
Depression regarding any of the above issues may be exhibited
in a number of ways: feelings of loss of worth, lack of self esteem,
guilt, thoughts of suicide, inability to concentrate, poor appetite,
inability to sleep properly, loss of energy, and fatigue."0 Some
studies seem to indicate that depression actually increases the
progression of HIV infection.81 Other studies, however, have
contradicted these results and the issue remains unresolved.82
Depressive symptoms may range from an adjustment disorder
with depressed mood to major depression.' The DSM-IVs' criteria
for adjustment disorder involves a maladaptive reaction to the
diagnosis of HIV.85 The reaction can result in impairment in social
or occupational functioning or symptoms that exceed a "normal"
reaction, such as major depression."8 Some HIV-infected women
experience major depression that should be seen as a treatable
disorder rather than merely an expected response to having HIV.87
C. Anxiety Disorders
Many women living with HIV also experience anxiety or panic
disorders.8 8 Anxiety disorders can range from adjustment disorders
with anxious moods to panic attacks.89 A panic attack usually is
78. See Cecile M.T. Gisbers Van Wijk et al., Male and Female Health Problems in
General Practice: The Differential Impact of Social Position and Social Roles, 40 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 597, 607 (1995).
79. See Pamela Adelmann et al., A Casual Analysis of Employment and Health in Midlife
Women, 16 WOMEN & HEALTH REV. 5, 6-8, 15-16 (1990).
80. See Sherr, supra note 9, at 112-14.
81. See generally Jeffrey H. Burack et al., Depressive Syndromes and CD4 Lymphocyte
Decline among HIV-Infected Men, 270 JAMA 2568 (1993) (finding that depressed subjects had
faster rates of decline in CD4 lymphocyte counts than those who were not depressed).
82. See Constantine G. Lyketos et al., Depressive Symptoms as Predictors of Medical
Outcomes in HIV Infection, 270 JAMA 2563, 2565 (1993).
83. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsORDERS 317-18, 623-27 (4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
84. The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is
more commonly referred to as the DSM-IV.
85. See DSM-IV, supra note 83, at 623-27.
86. See id. at 377-78.
87. See Samuel Perry & Baruch Fishman, Depression and HIV: How Does One Affect the
Other?, 270 JAMA 2609, 2610 (1993).
88. See WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 74.
89. See id. at 75.
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manifested by chest pain, heart palpitations, dizziness, trembling,
shaking, and fear of losing control during the attack.' "Many of the
physical symptoms of anxiety can be confused with AIDS-related
symptoms that may feed the cycle of anxiety."9'
Many women "with HIV infection worry about contagion,
especially abbut the possibility of infecting those they love."92 Many
also worry about the "incapacitating disease outcomes, particularly
AIDS dementia and loss of vision or mobility."" Fear of rejection
and fears relating to their inability to care for dependents are also
sources of anxiety for women.94
D. Delirium
Some AIDS patients also experience delirium caused by
metabolic or toxic abnormalities.95 Delirium is manifested by a
clouded state of consciousness, difficulty sustaining attention,
misinterpretations, illusions, hallucinations, increase or decrease
in motor activity, or a catatonic stupor.9" Delirium generally is not
a persistent state but a temporary disturbance that may be
treatable with medication.97
E. Suicide
Partly as a result of the above described mental health needs,
HIV/AIDS presents a risk factor for suicide.9" One study indicated
that the rate of suicide among New York City residents with AIDS
was sixty-six times higher than that of the general population of
New York residents.9 The results of a 1988 study also demon-
strated that the relative risk of suicide in California was substan-
90. See HOPP & ROGERS,. supra note 2, at 141.
91. Sherr, supra note 9, at 111.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See HOPP & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 141.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. For a discussion of the increased risk of suicide among people with HIV, see generally
George R. Brown & James R. Rundell, Suicidal Tendencies in Women with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 556 (1989); Richard N. Glass, AIDS
and Suicide, 259 JAMA 1369 (1988); Peter Marzuk et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in
Persons with AIDS, 259 JAMA 1333 (1988).
99. See Glass, supra note 98, at 1369.
226 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:215
tially higher for persons with AIDS than for persons without
AIDS. 100
Several psychosocial factors have been identified as possible
predictors of suicidal behavior: perceived social isolation, percep-
tion of self as a victim, and perceived lack of or unavailability of
social support.1 ' These factors are almost certainly present in the
prison system unless a range of mental health services, including
support groups, is offered. If not, the risk of suicide for HIV-
positive women inmates is certainly exacerbated.
F. Guilt
Women infected with HIV often experience guilt.12 There are
many possible sources of this guilt, including "their own mode of
infection, their feelings about possibly infected loved ones,... [and]
their emotional trauma associated with their limited ability to
provide care and attain a lifestyle that they may have aspired to."0 3
They also feel "[guilt] about their own past behavior" and their
perception of the infection as "punishment." 4 In addition, these
feelings of guilt may be exacerbated by other mental health issues
arising from HIV infection. 0
5
G. Bereavement
Bereavement is a common element of the psychological impact
of HIV infection for women.'0 6 Studies have found that bereave-
ment may manifest itself in greater sleep disturbance, greater
sedative and recreational drug use, and more frequent need for and
use of mental health services.'o7 "Bereavement can be associated
100. See generally Kenneth W. Kizer et al., AIDS and Suicide in California, 260 JAMA
1881 (1990) (describing a study indicating that suicide rates were higher for men with AIDS
than for men without AIDS).
101. See Mario Maj, Psychiatric Aspects of HIV-1 Infection and AIDS, 20 PSYCHOL. MED.
547, 558 (1990).
102. See Sherr, supra note 9, at 113.
103. Id. at 113-14.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See Brian Kelly et al., A Comparison of the Psychosocial Aspects of AIDS and Cancer-
Related Bereavement, 26 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY IN MED. 35, 36 (1996).
107. C.f John L. Martin, Psychological Consequences of AIDS-Related Bereavement among
Gay Men, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 856, 858, 860-61 (1988) (providing the
results of a study which found a direct connection between the number of bereavements and
increased sleep disturbance and drug use problems); John L. Martin & Laura Dean, Effects
of AIDS-Related Bereavement and HIV-Related Illness on Psychological Distress Among Gay
Men, 61 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 94, 102 (1993) (reporting the manifestations
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with losses that are not necessarily 'deaths." l For example, many
women mourn the loss of a shared future with their children and
bear the prospect of the additional burden of knowingly leaving
orphaned children." 9 HIV infection also may lead to the inability
of women to have children," 0 and so, as a result, "[wlomen who
wanted larger families may have to mourn the loss of these
additional children.""' This naturally may lead to bereavement for
those children who never were born.
112
In addition, many women who already have children are
concerned about losing contact with them."' This loss of contact
can happen in a variety of ways, including hospitalization, loss of
custody because of the inability to care for the child, and death."4
These factors clearly come into play when a woman is incarcerated
and physically cut off from her child.
H. Intervention and Treatment
Because many of the neuropsychological disorders associated
with HIV may respond to medication and/or other interventions, the
first step toward adequate treatment is "rapid and accurate
diagnosis."" 5 Systems for screening, monitoring, and diagnosis are
essential to the delivery of proper mental health services." 6
Psychological assessments, including clinical interviews and
cognitive, intellectual, and personality measurements, are helpful
in distinguishing between neurological disorders and purely
"psychological" disorders. 117 There is an ongoing debate as to which
groups of tests work best to assess cognitive changes in HIV-
positive women." 8 Researchers suggest that the development of a
of bereavement among men who lose close friends to AIDS); Richard Neugebauer et al.,
Bereavement Reactions among Homosexual Men Experiencing Multiple Losses in the AIDS
Epidemic, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1374, 1376-78 (1992) (finding that the level of depressive
symptoms increased with the number of bereavements).
108. Sherr, supra note 9, at 112.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 113.
114. See id.
115. MUKAND, supra note 46, at 230.
116. See id. at 230-33.
117. See id. at 232-33.
118. See, e.g., Nelson Butters et al., Assessment of AIDS-Related Cognitive Changes, 12
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOL 963, 963-78 (1990) (describing two alternative
tests designed for asymptomatic persons); Samuel W. Perry, Organic Mental Disorders
Caused by HIV, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 696, 701-04 (1990) (describing a variety of tests used
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brief neuropsychological test battery is important because symp-
tomatic HIV-positive women may tire easily.1 9 Doctors and
researchers currently employ a range of assessment instruments to
test for cognitive change.2 0 Some, like the Mini-Mental Status
Examination, take as little as fifteen minutes to administer,'
12
while others may take as long as seven to nine hours.'22 Regardless
of the type or length of the assessment, researchers agree that
caregivers should monitor their patients continuously for changing
symptoms.12
3
Medication also can be an effective intervention as certain
disorders, once properly diagnosed, respond well to drug therapy. 2
4
Medication can be useful in treating disturbances of mood and
sleep, 125 adjustment disorders, 12 depression, 127 acute agitation, 128
and delirium. 129 Early clinical trials have demonstrated that the
newly developed protease inhibitors such as Ritonair, Saquinavir,
and Indinavir can provide long-term suppression of HIV infection
by inhibiting the ability of the virus to replicate.' By inhibiting
the replication of the virus, these new drugs also may work to slow
or stabilize the progression of ADC.' l
Behavioral modification techniques are another useful inter-
vention. Programs teaching women skills such as relaxation
training, developing strategies for coping §kills, and problem-
solving techniques can be effective for those suffering from anxiety
and depression. 3 2 Patients with certain cognitive deficiencies that
may be caused by ADC need structure to limit the degree of
confusion and assist them in compensating for memory loss.'33
to detect early mental changes in HIV-positive patients).
119. See GRANT & MARTIN, supra note 57, at 182.
120. See id. at 161-87 for general discussion of various screening instruments and use of
computerized testing.
121. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 232-33.
122. See Butters et al., supra note 118, at 965.
123. See Hopp & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 137.
124. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 230; WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 74.
125. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 237; WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 75-76.
126. See WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 74.
127. See id. at 75.
128. See id. at 76.
129. See id.
130. See Enilio A. Emini & Jon H. Condra, Biochemical Pharmacology: Protease Inhibi-
tors, in TEXTBOOK OF AIDS MEDICINE 848, 848-51 (Thomas C. Merigan et al. eds., 1999).
131. See id. It also has been shown that zidothymidine (AZT) slowed the progression of
ADC. See Frederick A. Schmitt et al., Neuropsychological Outcome of Zidovudine (AZT)
Treatment of Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573,
1574 (1988).
132. See WINIARSKI, supra note 46, at 75.
133. See id.
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Highly structural programs that assist the patient in learning self
care through routinization of activities of daily living can be
extremely helpful in enhancing a patient's independence and self-
esteem."" Behavioral techniques also can assist in treatment of
dangerous behaviors associated with ADC or delirium and in pain
management and stress.
135
In addition, psychotherapy and counseling can be effective tools
to address nearly all the neuropsychological manifestations of AIDS
and HIV infection. The two differ significantly in the amount and
type of training required of those who deliver them.131 "Psychother-
apy is usually performed by doctoral-level persons, typically clinical
psychologists or psychiatrists. It is intended to change problematic
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors by creating new understandings
and then applying them in ways that benefit the patient." 137
Counseling, on the other hand, can be performed by either
paraprofessionals or professionals and typically is done by persons
with degrees at the bachelor's or master's level. 13  "Counseling
focuses on identifying specific current problems and delivering
concrete services as well as providing structure and support."
139
Counselors identify problems that require employment, medical, or
legal services and then make referrals to appropriate service
providers. 4 ° Counseling emphasizes external problems rather
than intrapsychic processes.
141
Studies comparing psychotherapy with counseling have shown
that patients with lower symptom levels or less severe disorders
usually showed significant benefits under both treatment modali-
ties. 142 Patients with more severe forms of depression, however,
did better with psychotherapy than with counseling. 143 Results of
studies which examined group therapy for HIV-positive patients
showed that participants in group therapy demonstrated significant
reductions in psychological distress as compared with a control
group that received no services. 144 The research illustrates that
134. See HOPp & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 136-37; MUKAND, supra note 46, at 231-34.
135. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 238.
136. See George E. Woody et al., Psychotherapy and Counseling for HIV-Positive
Individuals, in TEXTBOOKOF AIDS MEDICINE 911, supra note 130, at 911.
137. Id. at 911-12.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 912.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 913.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 914.
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both counseling and psychotherapy can be helpful in reducing the
emotional distress associated with HIV disease.
145
Specifically, psychotherapy and counseling assist patients in
working through depression, fear, and grief.1' Many patients with
adjustment disorders respond well to cognitive psychotherapy.
Suicide risk reduction can be accomplished through psychotherapy
by encouraging and allowing patients to verbalize their feelings and
thoughts about suicide. 147  Psychotherapy also can enhance and
strengthen coping and problem-solving skills important to suicide
reduction. 148
Psychotherapy groups and support groups are extremely
important for women with AIDS in helping to reduce guilt and
shame, decrease feelings of isolation and loneliness, and provide a
forum for sharing information and experiences. " 9 Social support is
crucial to the stabilization and the psychological well-being of
women living with AIDS. Lack of social support presents a
formidable strain in adjusting to AIDS and coping with the
psychological stress associated with HIV infection. 5 ' Effective
support groups need a facilitator who is knowledgeable about AIDS,
is non-judgmental, and can lead the group in sharing the knowledge
and experiences of women living with AIDS.'
5
'
Peer support groups can be especially effective in assisting
women inmates to work through their feelings of despair relating
to HIV infection. They can develop a level of trust that outside
counselors may not be able to achieve.'52 With peer facilitators,
inmates may be more able to verbalize their concerns without fear
145. See id.
146. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 236.
147. See Hopp & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 139.
148. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 237.
149. See id.; Sherr, supra note 9, at 112.
A few studies of the efficacy of these groups have been conducted. One study
of HIV-positive individuals found that those who attended support groups had
more social contact and lower levels of emotional distress than those who did
not. Non-attenders had more avoidant coping styles and higher levels of
psychological distress .... [Nion-attenders exhibited more emotional distress
regardless of how long they had known of their HIV positivity. These findings
imply that self-help support groups and other support services such as
volunteer "buddies" play an important role in the reduction of psychological
distress associated with being HIV positive.
Woody et al., supra note 136, at 914 (citing the findings of Seth C. Kalichman et al., People
Living with HIV Infection Who Attend and Do Not Attend Support Groups: A Pilot Study of
Needs, Characteristics, and Experiences, 8 AIDS CARE 589 (1996)).
150. Cf. Woody et al., supra note 136, at 914 (naming social support services as the
"backbone" of psychological services offered to HIV positive individuals).
151. See HOPp & ROGERS, supra note 2, at 154-55.
152. See HAmMEr ETAL., supra note 16, at 38.
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of being judged or of disclosure. 53 "Provided they are carefully
selected and trained, peer educators may be more credible with
inmates and more likely to speak in terms relevant to and under-
standable to inmates." 54 Peer counselors also may be more aware
of high risk behavior occurring within the facility and can discuss
this openly with female inmates. 5 ' Moreover, peer counseling can
be used at little or no cost to the system.
5 6
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution requires that the
psychosocial needs of HIV-positive women inmates must be
addressed by prison systems. This has been applied to the provi-
sion of mental health services. As described below, in Estelle v.
Gamble,' the Supreme Court established the "floor" of constitu-
tionally adequate health services. 5 ' Additionally, the Supreme
Court's ruling in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v.
Yeskey' 59 makes it clear that the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 6° is applicable in state prison systems. The next section
outlines what mental health services are minimally required
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment and how the ruling in Yeskey
may impact the provision of these services.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISON MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES
Inmate challenges to inadequate psychological care are based
on the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment."' 6 ' Origi-
nally, cases claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment involved
methods of punishment that were considered barbarous.'62 More
recent cases, however, have extended the concept of "cruel and
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See HAMMET ETAL., supra note 33, at 30.
157. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
158. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
159. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
160. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
162. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (indicating that burning at the stake,
crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel were cruel and unusual punishments); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (finding that punishments of torture prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment included instances in which the convicted defendant was disemboweled
alive, beheaded, quartered, and burned alive).
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unusual punishment" to all conditions of confinement in prisons
and jails. 63
In Estelle v. Gamble,' the Supreme Court specifically reviewed
the adequacy of medical health care in prisons and found that
failure to provide adequate health care could constitute cruel and
unusual punishment if it rises to the level of "deliberate indiffer-
ence to serious medical needs" of inmates.'65 Estelle set forth a two-
prong test to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment
regarding the adequacy of medical care for physical disorders: (1)
the treatment given must show deliberate indifference, and (2) the
treatment must be in response to serious medical needs.'66
After Estelle, lower courts held that there was no logical
distinction between the right to medical care for physical disorders
and the right to mental health care for psychological or psychiatric
disorders. 6 The Tenth Circuit applied the deliberate indifference
standard to all conditions of confinement, including the right to
mental health care.' 68 As a result, it is now clearly established that
the deliberate indifference standard applies to serious mental
disorders, and therefore the failure to provide adequate mental
health care in prisons violates the Constitution.
163. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (holding that court could find that
prison conditions, including overcrowding and excessive noise, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment if plaintiff could show culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials); see
also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (noting that public perception of standards
of decency with respect to criminal sanctions and accordance with the basic underlying
concept of the Eighth Amendment demand that the dignity of man must be considered when
deciding whether a punishment is cruel and unusual); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02
(1958) (finding that punishment in the form of denationalization is cruel and unusual in that
it strips the citizen of his political community and his place in organized society); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)' (noting that the Eighth Amendment may be
interpreted in a manner that is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice").
164. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
165. Id. at 105.
166. See id. at 106.
167. See Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d
1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994);
Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991); Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th
Cir. 1990); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th
Cir. 1986); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217
(1984); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982); Inmates of Allegheny County
Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.
1977).
168. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980).
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A. Deliberate Indifference
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
prove both an objective element, that the deprivation was suffi-
ciently serious, and a subjective element, that the defendant
officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. As stated
above, the state of mind giving rise to liability for an Eighth
Amendment violation is "deliberate indifference."1"9 Lower courts
have argued extensively about what constitutes deliberate indiffer-
ence.
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court made it clear that deliberate
indifference could be manifested by a prison doctor's failure to
respond to a prisoner's needs, by prison personnel intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care, or by intentionally
interfering with treatment once it has been prescribed. 70 However,
accident, inadvertent failure, and negligence are not actionable
under the Eighth Amendment.' Even multiple claims of medical
malpractice do not necessarily constitute deliberate indifference.'72
Therefore, it is clear from Estelle and subsequent cases that the
term "deliberate indifference" means more than mere negligence.
Although Estelle established that deliberate indifference
requires a showing of more than negligence, courts also have held
that an inmate need not prove that officials had the very high state
of mind required in excessive force cases: a showing that official
conduct was carried out with "a knowing willingness that [harm]
occur."173 In general, courts have not required this standard of
169. See supra text accompanying note 165.
170. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see also Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)
("Prison officials are more than merely negligent if they deliberately defy the express
instructions of a prisoner's doctors.").
171. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991) (stating that mere negligence does
not satisfy the "deliberate indifference" standard); Bryan v. Endell, 141 F.3d 1290, 1291 (8th
Cir. 1998) (determining that even if treatment of inmate's broken hand was inadequate and
negligent, the treatment still did not rise to the level of "deliberate indifference"); McNeil v.
Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Obduracy and wantonness rather than inadvertence
or mere negligence characterize conduct prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."); Mandel v.
Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 787-88 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that mere negligence or medical
malpractice is not sufficient to constitute deliberate indifference); cf Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-
06 (explaining that while a single act of negligence is not sufficient to support a claim of cruel
and unusual punishment, if inmates could establish a pattern of negligent acts, a claim
under the Eighth Amendment would be stated).
172. See, e.g., Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1245 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Multiple
incidences of medical malpractice or negligence do not amount to deliberate indifference
without some specific threat of harm from a related system wide deficiency.").
173. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1992). The Hudson Court noted that objective
standards used to determine culpable state of mind are different in confinement condition
claims then in excessive force claims. But see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) ("It
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purposeful or knowing conduct to establish the necessary mens rea
for deliberate indifference in a prison condition case.
With deliberate indifference lying somewhere between negli-
gence at one end of the spectrum and intentional or knowledgeable
conduct at the other, most cases have identified "recklessness" or
"reckless disregard" as the state of mind required to make officials
liable for deliberate indifference in a prison conditions case.1"4
Based on the concept of recklessness, earlier cases found
deliberate indifference "[w]hen systematic deficiencies in staffing,
facilities or procedure ma[die unnecessary suffering inevitable."' 5
Deliberate indifference also was found when prison officials
intentionally "prevented an inmate from receiving recommended
treatment or when an inmate was denied access to medical
personnel capable of evaluating the need for treatment."'76
Unreasonable delay in providing services when officials were aware
of the need for treatment was also the basis for a finding of
deliberate indifference.' 77
Mere disagreements as to the quality and the type of health
care were not found to rise to the level of "reckless disregard" and
is obduracy and wantonness not inadvertence in error or good faith, that characterize the
conduct prohibited by the cruel and unusual punishment clause, whether that conduct occurs
in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or
restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.").
174. See, e.g., McNeil, 16 F.3d at 124 (noting that a "total unconcern for [inmatesl welfare
in the face of serious risks" is required ); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir.
1993) ("In prison condition cases, 'deliberate indifference' constitutes wantonness .... To be
deliberately indifferent, a prison official must knowingly or recklessly disregard an inmate's
basic needs so that knowledge can be inferred."); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th
Cir. 1991) (quoting Duckworth v. Frazen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985)) (drawing
distinction between the tort of recklessness and the criminal standard, which states that
"recklessness" violates the Eighth Amendment only if the prison official had "actual
knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to
prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it"); Miltier v.
Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990) ("To establish that a health care provider's
actions constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment must be
so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness. Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either
actual or reckless disregard.").
175. Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1055 (D.S.D. 1984), affd, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.
1986) (quoting Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983)).
176. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980).
177. See, e.g., Toombs v. Bell, 798 F.2d 297, 298 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting delay of three
weeks for treatment of gallbladder supports a claim of deliberate indifference); Madrid v.
Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[Alccess to medical treatment cannot be
substantially delayed in a systematic manner."); Dean v. Coughlin, 623 F. Supp. 392, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (determining that a three month delay for serious and painful dental need
requires finding of deliberate indifference). But see Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th
Cir. 1987) (finding that a delay of one week for psychiatrist to evaluate a suicidal inmate on
"crisis watch" did not constitute deliberate indifference).
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therefore did not constitute deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.'78 Courts have generally held that the propriety of
a certain course of treatment is not a proper subject for judicial
review as long as the physician has exercised professional judg-
ment. 1
79
With respect to psychiatric treatment, reliance on professional
judgment has been addressed most clearly by the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon in its supplemental opinion
in Capps v. Atiyeh."8 ° The Capps court stated that the issue of
deliberate indifference is more difficult to determine with respect
to mental health care than medical care. Because much is unknown
about mental illness, its diagnosis and treatment remain more
subjective than with physical illness.' Thus, the court must
distinguish between constitutionally inadequate treatment and a
course of treatment upon which mental health care professionals
could reasonably disagree. Citing the Supreme Court's standard for
adequate care in Youngberg v. Romeo,"8 2 the Capps court said, with
respect to the type of treatment selected, that "the Constitution
only requires that the courts make certain that professional
judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts
to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should
have been made."'83
Following the Youngberg decision, the Capps court established
a fairly stringent standard that inmates must meet in order to
prove deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs: "The
178. See Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1024 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
disagreement with selection of medicine and therapy fell well short of deliberate
indifference); Randall v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prisoner's
"difference in opinion over matters of expert medical judgment or a prescribed course of
medical treatment" does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference); Kontakis v. Pahlow,
671 F. Supp. 328, 330 (D.N.J. 1987) ("A doctor's choice of a particular medical treatment
cannot be the basis for a charge of cruel and unusual punishment."); Williams v. Coughlin,
650 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that disagreements over proper medical
treatment do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference).
179. See Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that sound medical
decisions are not actionable merely because there may have been disagreement over
treatment); Burns v. Head Jailer of LaSalle County Jail, 576 F. Supp. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (finding that "the propriety of a certain course of medical treatment is not a proper
subject for review in a civil rights action"); Williams v. Duckworth, 598 F. Supp. 9, 15 (N.D.
Ind. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Even if it could be argued that plaintiff's claim
is grounded on a sincere disagreement with the type and quality of diagnosis and treatment
received, such disagreement with treating doctors still does not rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation.").
180. 559 F. Supp. 894, 917 (D. Or. 1982).
181. See id. (citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977)).
182. 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
183. Capps, 559 F. Supp. at 917 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321).
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inmates must, therefore, show a pattern of cases, each of which
discloses, with little or no room for reasonable mental medical
opinions to differ, (1) a serious mental illness (2) for which the
inmate wants treatment (3) which he does not receive (4) thereby
causing the inmate to suffer mental pain."' Therefore, if state
officials can show that they were aware of the needs and exercised
acceptable professional judgment, inmates will not be able to show
that the officials recklessly disregarded their needs and so would
not be able to prove deliberate indifference.
In Weaver v. Jarvis,l"5 the court found that though courts were
reluctant to second guess medical judgment, "in some cases the
medical attention rendered may be so woefully inadequate as to
amount to no treatment at all."'8 The court then held that deliber-
ate indifference included "recklessness or callous neglect."187 Like-
wise, in Greason v. Kemp,88 the court held that providing some psy-
chiatric care is not sufficient if the care provided is grossly inade-
quate.' In Greason, the prison psychiatrist discontinued an in-
mate's psychotropic medication on the basis of a visit of a few
minutes, without reviewing the inmate's file or performing a mental
status examination. 90 If the doctor had reviewed the inmate's file
he would have seen that the inmate was at high risk for suicide
when taken off the medication. The court held that psychiatric
needs constitute serious medical needs and that the quality of
psychiatric care one receives can be so substantial a deviation from
accepted standards as to evidence, as in this case, a deliberate
indifference to those needs even when professional judgment was
exercised.'
Even though most courts used a standard generally equated
with recklessness, courts continued to be split as to whether an
objective or a subjective standard of knowledge on the part of
officials was required to establish liability. Some lower courts,
using the objective standard, required that the inmate show that
officials disregarded a serious need about which they knew or
should have known.'92 Other courts required the inmate to
184. Id. at 917-18.
185. 611 F. Supp. 40 (D. Ga. 1985).
186. Id. at 43 (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)).
187. Id. at 44.
188. 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990).
189. See id. at 834.
190. See id. at 835.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that "liability may
be imposed under certain circumstances in which the defendant has only objective knowledge
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establish that officials had actual knowledge of a serious need and
yet disregarded it. 193 In 1994, the Supreme Court resolved the
debate by holding that:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.'"'
Therefore, in order to establish deliberate indifference, inmates
will be required to establish that prison officials knew of the
claimant's mental health need. Whether an official has knowledge
of a particular need, however, is a question of fact that can be
resolved in favor of the inmate if the trier of fact could conclude that
the official must have known of the need from the very fact that it
was so obvious.' 95
B. Serious Need
A serious medical need has been defined as "one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention." 96  The test for determining whether a
prisoner is entitled to treatment is medical necessity, not simply
what is desirable.
197
With respect to mental illness, a court held that an inmate's
statement that he was depressed does not require the prison official
to whom the statement was made to schedule him for an appoint-
ment with a psychologist, as mere depression "hardly indicates a
of the risk of harm" provided that the risk is substantial); Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d
392, 395 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Bentley v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985)) ("A
defendant acts recklessly when he disregards a substantial risk of danger that either is
known to him or would be apparent to a reasonable person in his position").
193. See, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring that the
prison official acted "knowingly or recklessly" to infer knowledge); Duckworth v. Franzen,
780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring actual knowledge to infer prison official's failure
to stop preventable harm).
194. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
195. See id. at 843.
196. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980).
197. See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
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'serious medical need.""'9 Additionally, the Capps court held that
inmates with behavioral and emotional problems did not suffer
from serious mental illness.'99 On the other hand, acute depression,
paranoid schizophrenia, and nervous collapse have been identified
as disorders sufficiently dramatic to amount to serious medical
needs.200 Likewise, in Cody v. Hillard,2"' the court found that an
inmate experiencing significant personality distress in the form of
depression, to the extent that he had lost contact with reality,
required treatment.2 2
In Peterkin v. Jeffes,20 3 the court was asked to rule on the
adequacy of psychiatric care for capital inmates. The court first
addressed whether death row inmates have mental health needs
that amount to serious medical needs.20 4 Relying on expert
testimony from mental health care professionals indicating that
capital inmates have a high incidence of chronic depression,
disorientation, and anxiety, the court found that those inmates
have unique psychological needs.20 5 These psychological needs
collectively constituted "serious needs" for Eighth Amendment
purposes.20 6
At least one court has addressed the specific mental health
needs of HIV-positive inmates. In Harris v. Thigpen,207 the lower
court heard expert testimony which indicated that HIV-positive
inmates have unique mental health needs that were not being
addressed adequately by the prison system.20 ' The Court of Appeals
identified as serious mental health needs "specific psychiatric
disorders... that accompany the presence of HIV infection, such as
AIDS-related dementia.... " 209 The court, however, found that an
inmate's need to "deal with issues of impending death, depression,
despair, and stigmatization" were not serious mental health
needs.21 ° The court explained that "helping a terminally sick
prisoner 'cope' psychologically with various aspects of a dreaded
physical illness, while therapeutic, may be a more expansive view
198. Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (N.D. I1. 1981).
199. See Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 920 (D. Or. 1982).
200. See Robert E. v. Lane, 530 F. Supp. 930, 939 (N.D. 111. 1981).
201. 599 F. Supp. 1025 (D.S.D. 1984).
202. See id. at 1043.
203. 661 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
204. See id. at 917.
205. See id. at 919.
206. See id.
207. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
208. See id. at 1510.
209. Id. at 1511.
210. Id.
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of mental health care than that contemplated by the Eighth
Amendment."211 The court held that failure to address these needs
did not violate the Constitution. Therefore, based on Harris, it
appears that feelings of depression, anxiety, and despair alone will
not be considered serious mental health needs.
Women living with HIV/AIDS, however, also experience chronic
depression and anxiety that may be analogous to the depression
and anxiety experienced by death row inmates. If the depression
and anxiety become chronic, courts may deem them "serious needs"
for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis.
C. Specific Treatment Issues
Assuming that the psychological manifestations of HIV/AIDS
reach the level of serious medical need, what types of services are
constitutionally required? Recent cases have challenged specific
treatment issues, including the adequacy of the initial procedure
utilized to identify mentally disordered inmates, the adequacy of
staffing, the adequacy of record keeping, the right to rehabilitative
programs, and the right to participate in substance abuse pro-
grams.
1. Screening and Classification
Courts routinely have found that a prison must have a
systematic procedure for identifying inmates with psychological
problems. Prisons should have" a process for screening inmates
upon entry into the prison to identify those who have mental health
needs.212 Additionally, prisons must have an ongoing system to
monitor and identify problems after incarceration.213 Adequately
trained staff must perform the screening and classification to detect
the need for mental health care.21 4 Screening by a staff member
untrained to detect a mental illness amounts to no screening and
does not meet constitutional minima.
211. Id.
212. See Cortes-Quiones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 560 (1st Cir. 1988); Coleman
v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1305 (E.D: Cal. 1995); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146,
1257 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1550 (D. Ariz. 1993); Balla v. Idaho
State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1580 (D. Idaho 1984); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527
F. Supp. 1252, 1308 (S.D. W. Va. 1981); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala.
1976), affd in part and modified in part sub nom., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F. 2d 283 (5th
Cir. 1977), remanded on other grounds sub nom., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
213. See Balla, 595 F. Supp. at 1568.
214. See Dawson, 527 F. Supp. at 1273.
240 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:215
2. Adequate Staffing
The quality and quantity of staff available to provide psycholog-
ical care is a crucial issue for prisons attempting to provide
adequate mental health services to inmates with HIV or AIDS.
First, prisons must have an adequate number of staff to provide
inmates with genuine access to mental health professionals.215
Second, the staff must be qualified to provide adequate care, and
staff who can communicate with non-English speaking inmates
must be available. Failure to provide qualified interpreters for
medical/mental care encounters has been held to constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation."l' As the court stated in Wellman v.
Faulkner:
An impenetrable language barrier between doctor and patient
can readily lead to misdiagnoses and therefore unnecessary
pain and suffering. This type of language problem which is
uncorrected over a long period of time and as to which there is
no prospect of alleviation, can contribute to unconstitutional
deficiencies in medical care.
217
Depending on the size of the facility, courts have found that
lack of an on-site psychiatrist can constitute deliberate indiffer-
ence. 21 1 Furthermore, drugs cannot be a substitute for psychiatric
counseling and are an unacceptable means of dealing with psychiat-
215. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding that staffing
shortfalls effectively deny inmates access to diagnosis and treatment); Cody v. Hillard, 599
F. Supp. 1025, 1059 (D.S.D. 1984) ("[Ihe findings indicate the critically inadequate number
of mental care staff at the SDSP."); Balla, 595 F. Supp. at 1577 (requiring, at a minimum,
the equivalent of one full-time psychiatrist on staff); Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F. Supp. 504,
524-25 (S.D. Ill. 1980) (finding that staff shortages render medical services below
constitutional level).
216. See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S.
1217 (1984). But see Franklin v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 163 F.3d 625, 636
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding the prison's bilingual staff reasonable and adequate under the
circumstances and no violation of prisoner's privacy when other prisoners served as
translators during medical exams).
217. Wellman, 715 F.2d at 272.
218. See, e.g., Wellman, 715 F.2d at 269 (finding an on-site psychiatrist necessary to treat
emergencies and to follow patients who need to be maintained on long-term psychotropic
medication); Ramos, 639 F.2d at 577-78 (stating that due to no on-site psychiatrist, 10-25%
of inmates had to wait up to five weeks before getting access to any help); Duran v. Anaya,
642 F. Supp. 510, 525 (D.N.M. 1986) (finding that an inmate cannot be denied access to
medical personnel); Baila, 595 F. Supp. at 1568 (finding that inmates were often prescribed
psychotropic medication in lieu of psychiatric counseling because of lack of staff).
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ric disorders if they are used as the only means of addressing the
disorder.219
Although it is clear that treatment cannot be delayed due to
insufficient staff,220 a survey of cases offers little in the way of a
guideline for what is constitutionally mandated in terms of the ratio
of staff to inmates. For example, in Cody v. Hillard,221 the court
found that a staff consisting of five full-time psychologists, seven
full-time counselors, and two and one-half full-time drug and
alcohol counselors was not constitutionally adequate to serve the
inmates of the South Dakota Prison System when the only psychia-
trist involved visited the prison one day per week and then for only
about five hours on a volunteer basis.222 On the other hand, in
Toussaint v. McCarthy,223 the court found mental health services
constitutionally adequate. In the Toussaint case, the Folsom Prison
psychiatric staff consisted of two psychiatrists and one psychologist
to care for an inmate population of 3,500.224 The court reached its
holding despite finding that the staff was overburdened to the point
that almost all treatment was devoted to emergency cases, with
minimal individual treatment and no group therapy.2
5
In Grubbs v. Bradley,226 the court reviewed the mental health
services provided at each of the facilities in the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Corrections and found that only one of the seven facilities
had on-site psychiatric care.2 Three facilities had a few counselors
and one psychologist while three other facilities employed only
counselors with no on-site psychiatrist or psychologist.228 Although
the court determined that the services provided at each individual
facility were generally inadequate, because the inmates could be
transferred to a special psychiatric facility if acutely ill, the court
held that the system's mental health care services were constitu-
tionally sufficient.229
Thus, with respect to the adequacy of staffing, most courts
require, at a minimum, some access to on-site psychiatric care and,
219. See Balla, 595 F. Supp. at 1577; Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
220. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.
Supp. 1146, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
221. 599 F. Supp. 1025 (D.S.D. 1984).
222. See id. at 1041-42.
223. 597 F. Supp. 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1984), affd in part, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).
224. See id. at 1403-04.
225. See id.
226. 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
227. See id. at 1086.
228. See id. at 1086, 1094, 1097,. 1102, 1105, 1107.
229. See id. at 1130.
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more generally, that staff be adequately trained to identify and
assess the psychiatric needs of inmates.30 The case law fails,
however, to offer a clear set of rules for what else the Constitution
mandates. The above cases demonstrate that much depends on
other factors, such as the overall quality of the facility and the
availability of mental health services by way of transfer.""
3. Record Keeping
In Ruiz v. Estelle,232 the court found that maintaining adequate
medical records was essential to providing acceptable medical care
for inmates.3 3 The court held that "accurate, complete, and
confidential records of the mental health treatment process must be
maintained."234
Likewise, in Burks v. Teasdale,23 5 the court decreed that
continuity of care is essential to an adequate mental health care
system.236 The decentralization of records and the frequent rotation
of staff created such a disorganized system that continuity of care
was impossible.23 7 As a result, the court determined that the record
keeping system contributed to the overall unacceptability of thehealth care provided.238 In Coleman v. Wilson, 39 the court discov-
ered serious deficiencies in medical record keeping.' The deficien-
cies included "disorganized, untimely and incomplete filing of
[information in the] medical records, insufficient charting, and
incomplete or nonexistent treatment plans."241 In addition, the
court found that inmates were often transferred without their
medical records.242 The lack of accurate record keeping frustrated
the continuity of care and therefore was found to be a violation of
the Eighth Amendment.243
230. See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S.
1217 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir. 1979); Cody v. Hillard, 599 F.
Supp. 1025, 1058 (D.S.D. 1984), affd, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906
(1988); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1577 (D. Idaho 1984).
231. See Grubbs, 552 F. Supp. at 1052.
232. 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
233. See id. at 1339.
234. Id.
235. 492 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
236. See id. at 660.
237. See id. at 676.
238. See id.
239. 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
240. See id. at 1297.
241. Id. at 1314.
242. See id.
243. See id.
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In other cases, courts have found record keeping systems to be
unconstitutional in situations in which the information was not
kept in any particular order or the information failed to include
clear diagnosis and treatment plans for each inmate.2 " Courts
have held that "Itihe Eighth Amendment is implicated when
'inadequate, inaccurate and unprofessionally maintained medical
records' give rise to 'the possibility for disaster stemming from a
failure to properly chart' the medical care received by inmates."246
Therefore, courts sensibly continue to demand precise record
keeping as a basic component in a constitutionally adequate health
care system. Accurate records allow for the necessary continuity of
care and thereby avoid the risk of needless pain and suffering.
4. Rehabilitation Programs
As a general rule, there is no Eighth Amendment right to
rehabilitation, and thus the mere failure of a prison system to
provide rehabilitative programming is not generally, standing
alone, unconstitutional.246 The court in Ramos v. Lamm,247
however, stated that the inmate is constitutionally guaranteed a
right "to be confined in an environment which does not result in...
degeneration or ... [threaten the inmate's] mental and physical
well being."248 On the other hand, the court in Grubbs found that
the only degeneration that reached constitutional proportions is
"physical or mental deterioration that is so severe that it amounts
to unnecessary pain and suffering. "249 Furthermore, in Harris v.
Thigpen,"' the court found that the Alabama prison system's
failure to provide resources and preventative therapy necessary to
delay the general psychological deterioration of inmates infected
with HIV did not violate the Constitution.25 ' Thus, the general rule
244. See Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1057 (D.S.D. 1984), affd, 799 F.2d 447 (8th
Cir. 1986); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1307-08 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
245. Cody, 599 F. Supp. at 1057 (quoting Burks v. Teasdale, 492 F. Supp. 650, 676 (W.D.
Mo. 1980)).
246. See Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 1980); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1123 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); see
also Lovell v. Brennan, 566 F. Supp. 672, 689 (D. Me. 1983) (stating that courts have not
recognized a constitutional right to rehabilitation for prisoners); Robert E. v. Lane, 530 F.
Supp. 930, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (declaring that, to state an Eighth Amendment claim, a
prisoner must allege more than lack of access to rehabilitative programs).
247. 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980).
248. Id. at 566.
249. Grubbs, 552 F. Supp. at 1124.
250. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
251. See id. at 1506.
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remains that prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilita-
tion.
In spite of this general rule, there are two situations in which
the courts have held that the lack of rehabilitative programs does
create constitutionally inadequate conditions of confinement. One
such situation exists when overall conditions are so intolerable that
the court finds that rehabilitation may help in overcoming some
other constitutionally inadequate condition.252 Though lack of
rehabilitative programs, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove an
Eighth Amendment violation, its absence in the face of other
conditions may violate the Eighth Amendment.25 In Dawson v.
Kendrick, the court stated that "rehabilitation is only required to
the degree that the totality of the conditions of confinement are
identified as causing the physical, mental, or social degeneration of
the prisoners .... 254
The court observed that overall conditions at the Mercer
County Jail were so bad that some form of rehabilitation was
necessary:
Under the totality of conditions existent at the Mercer County
Jail . . . the court believes that the undue risk of physical,
mental and social degeneration of the prisoners housed there
can be sufficiently deterred by the provision of opportunities for
exercise to the extent previously required by this decree and the
furnishing of diverse periodicals and other reading materials of
sufficient quantities for the number of prisoners housed in the
jail.55
The second situation in which lack of rehabilitation is a
constitutional violation is when an inmate has been indefinitely
incarcerated until he can show evidence of his rehabilitation. For
example, Ohlinger v. Watson256 involved a state sodomy statute,
which generally carried a maximum term of fifteen years.257 Yet, if
the court made a finding that a defendant possessed a mental
disturbance predisposing him to the commission of sex offenses, he
could be given an indeterminate life sentence.2 51 Several inmates
who received indeterminate life sentences under the statute
252. See Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 12.52, 1252 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
253. See id.
254. Id. at 1315.
255. Id. at 1316.
256. 652 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1978).
257. See id. at 776.
258. See id. at 777.
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challenged the mental health treatment available to them in the
prison system, claiming that they had no chance to rehabilitate
themselves and thereby gain their release.259 In analyzing what
care was available, the court found only limited group therapy. The
court stated that "[tihe treatment provided appellants... [did] not
give them a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve their
mental conditions."260
A more recent case dealing with a similar fact situation was
Balla v. Idaho State Board of Corrections.26 ' Like the Ohlinger
court, the Balla court had to interpret what was required of the
state after an inmate had been incarcerated under a special sex
offenders act pursuant to which the inmate could not be released
without showing evidence of rehabilitation. 22 The Idaho State
Correctional Institution employed only two mental health care
workers for more than 1100 inmates.263 The court found that
because psychiatric care was virtually nonexistent and no rehabili-
tation programs existed, the longer sentence received by inmates
incarcerated pursuant to the Sex Offenders Act was quid pro quo
for the right to receive rehabilitative programs in order to obtain
release from confinement.2  As a result, rehabilitation programs
for those prisoners were required to meet constitutional minima.
265
Therefore, the rule generally remains that there is no constitu-
tional right to rehabilitative programs. However, rehabilitation
programs are constitutionally required if it can be shown (1) that
overall conditions are unconstitutional and rehabilitation programs
would assist in making conditions tolerable, or (2) that rehabilita-
tion is the specific statutory purpose of the incarceration.
5. Substance Abuse Programs
Although there is no general constitutional right to rehabilita-
tion, the lack of substance abuse programs in a prison with an
identifiable population in need of such programs may cause the
system to fail to meet constitutional minima.
In Ramos v. Lamm, 6 the district court found that 68% of the
inmates at Colorado State Penitentiary had drug and alcohol
259. See id.
260. Id. at 780.
261. 595 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Idaho 1984).
262. See id. at 1578.
263. See id. at 1567-68.
264. See id. at 1578.
265. See id.
266. 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979).
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problems.267 Additionally, data from diagnostic tests revealed that
90% of incoming inmates had significant drug and alcohol involve-
ment.2 68 Yet, only a few programs existed-and those that did exist
involved what the court referred to as a "smidgen of prisoners." 269
The court found that "[d]efendants' disregard of the need of
prisoners for drug and alcohol treatment contributes to the totality
of conditions which make degeneration probable and self-improve-
ment unlikely. In fact, two thirds of Colorado inmates paroled in
recent years had drug or alcohol problems when they were re-
leased."276 Thus, if it can be shown that there is an identifiable
population within the prison with drug and alcohol problems,
prisons may be required to specifically address this problem
through support groups and counseling.
6. Privacy and Confidentiality
One final issue that has been raised by inmates with respect to
mental health services is the right to privacy and confidentiality
during counseling. In Peterkin v. Jeffes, 71 capital inmates chal-
lenged the lack of privacy and confidentiality of communications
with psychiatrists, psychologists, and counselors.2 72 Because these
inmates were on death row, mental health workers could visit them
only at the door of their cell, and, for security reasons, guards had
to accompany the workers.27 3 As a result of these cell door visits,
confidential communications were revealed to administrators.274
Responding to the inmates' argument that these practices elimi-
nated privacy and undermined the value of the mental health care
services, the court found that privacy and/or confidentiality were
required in order to provide meaningful access to mental health
treatment. 5
7. Summary
Therefore, if neuropsychological disorders associated with HIV
are shown to be "serious mental health needs," prison systems will
267. See id. at 146.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 147.
270. Id.
271. 661 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
272. See id. at 917.
273. See id. at 918.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 926.
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have to provide adequate mental health services in order to address
those needs. A system for screening, diagnosis, and monitoring is
basic to an adequate system. There must be an appropriate number
of properly trained staff to make access to mental health services
meaningful. Record keeping must be accurate, complete, and
confidential to ensure continuity of care. Depending on what other
services are available, rehabilitative programs may be required.
Finally, substance abuse programs, including support groups, are
required if there is an identifiable drug and alcohol problem among
inmates.
V. IMPACT OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS V. YESKEY2 76
In addition to the constitutional parameters set forth above,
state correctional facilities may have additional obligations to
provide mental health care services to HIV-positive female inmates
as a result of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey. 27 The Yeskey case involved a
state prison inmate who was denied admission to a prison boot
camp program due to a history of hypertension27 Yeskey, who was
sentenced to eighteen to thirty-six months, could have been paroled
in just six months had he successfully completed the boot camp
program.279 Yeskey claimed that the denial based on his disability
was a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).28 °
The district court found that Yeskey failed to state a claim for relief
because the ADA did not apply to state prisons.281 The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, held that Title II of the ADA does
apply to state prison facilities.2 2 Title II of the ADA prohibits
discrimination by a public entity and provides that "[n]o qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity."283
The Court held that "[miodern prisons provide inmates with
many recreational 'activities,' 'medical services,' and educational
276. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
277. Id.
278. See id. at 208.
279. See id. at 206.
280. See id. at 208.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 213.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
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and vocational programs."2 ' Further, there is nothing in the
statute itself that justifies 'distinguishing the programs and
activities provided in prisons from those provided by other state
entities. 215 The Court questioned the prison officials' argument that
the lack of reference to prisons in the statute's findings section was
evidence that Congress did not intend for the ADA to apply to
correctional facilities.'" According to the Court, "the fact that a
statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth."287 Therefore, the Court found no reason to conclude that
the ADA was not intended to apply to prisons.88
Although Title II of the ADA now clearly applies to state
prisons, the Supreme Court did not address exactly how the ADA
should be implemented within the prison setting. Two issues are
certain to surface with respect to the application of the ADA in the
prison context. First, it seems clear that women inmates infected
with HIV will still have to show they have an ADA qualifying
disability before they can seek the protections of the ADA. Whether
HIV infection in its earliest stages is a disability for ADA purposes
was clarified only partly by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v.
Abbott,28 9 but the issue must still be decided on a case-by-case
basis.29 0 Second, just as constitutional rights sometimes are limited
in the prison setting based on security concerns, it should be
expected that prison officials would raise similar claims regarding
implementation of the statutory rights under the ADA. How a
court will interpret what constitutes a "reasonable" accommodation
in the prison setting and whether an inmate constitutes "a qualified
individual" surely will be additional issues for litigation.
A. Is HIV Infection a Disability under the ADA?
To have a successful claim against a prison or other public
entity under the ADA, a plaintiff must meet four criteria: the
plaintiff must be found to be (1) a qualified individual, (2) with a
disability, (3) who has been discriminated against by a public
284. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 211-12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994) (listing the findings of
Congress of areas in which discrimination against individuals exist).
287. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (quoting Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
288. See id. at 213.
289. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
290. See id. at 641-42.
19991 MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF HIV-INFECTED WOMEN INMATES 249
entity, (4) because of her disability.291 The ADA defines disability
as follows:
the term "disability" means, with respect to an individual (A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment. 92
The terms "impairment," "major life activity," and "substantial
limitation" are not specifically defined in the statute but have been
defined in the regulations promulgated to implement the ADA.293
Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations promulgated under
Title II of the ADA provide that
the phrase "physical or mental impairment" includes, but is not
limited to, such contagious and noncontagious diseases and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impair-
ments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease
(whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug
addiction, and alcoholism.29'
"Major life activities" are defined in the DOJ regulations as
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."295 A person is "substantially limited" if she is "unable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform," and the factors that should be considered
in making this determination are "(i) [tihe nature and severity of
the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) [tihe permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment."
296
The second statutory definition of "disability" allows an
individual to seek the protection of the ADA if the person can show
that he or she has a record or history of an impairment that at one
291. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
293. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1999).
294. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(B)(ii).
295. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
296. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii)(2)(i) - (iii) (1998).
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time substantially limited a major life activity.297 This provision
attempts to protect people with a history of a disability, such as
individuals with a history of cancer or mental illness.2 98
The third definition of disability is designed to protect individu-
als from the myths and fears associated with disabilities.299 An
individual will be protected under this third definition if she has an
impairment that does not substantially limit her activities, but she
is treated as if she has a limitation."' She also is protected if a
limitation exists because of the attitudes of others toward the
impairment. 0'' For example, if an employer refuses to hire a person
because of a facial deformity, that individual may be protected
under the ADA.
Whether HIV infection is a disability for purposes of the ADA
has been open to debate for some time. Between 1990, when
Congress passed the ADA, and 1998, when the Supreme Court
decided Bragdon v. Abbott, °2 several lower courts and two circuit
courts held that HIV infection was a disability,303 while the Fourth
Circuit held it was not a disability per se. °4 The Supreme Court
resolved the circuit split by holding in Bragdon that HIV infection
297. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1998); see also Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.
Supp. 1310, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that a "record of impairment" means that the
plaintiff has to show a history of an impairment that led directly to the facts that gave rise
to the litigation).
298. See U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 11-22 (1992).
299. See id. at 11-23.
300. See id. at 11-22.
301. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(4)(iii) (1999); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3).
302. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
303. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (lth Cir. 1996) (noting
that ADA regulations define disability to include the HIV virus); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a person infected with the HIV virus is an individual
with a disability within the meaning of Rehabilitation Act, as well as in the ADA); Anderson
v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (stating
that AIDS and HIV are per se disabilities); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D.
Pa. 1995) ("Individuals diagnosed as HIV-positive are considered disabled for purposes of the
Act, whether they are symptomatic or asymptomatic."); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317,
319 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("It is now settled law that HIV-positive individuals are 'disabled'
within the meaning of the ADA."); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D.
La. 1995) ("AIDS/HIV-positive are both disabilities under the Department of Justice
regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA."); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp.
1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("The [HIV-positive] plaintiff has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, and thus has a disability
within the meaning of the Act."); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("AIDS
and HIV infection are both disabilities within the meaning of the ADA."); T.E.P. v. Leavitt,
840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993) (finding that AIDS is a physical impairment within the
meaning of the ADA).
304. See Ennis v. National Assoc. of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
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is a disability for purposes of the ADA if the plaintiff can show that
it substantially limits a major life activity."0 5 In Bragdon, the Court
found that reproduction was a major life activity and that the
female plaintiff, who was in the early stages of HIV and was
basically "asymptomatic," had adequately demonstrated that her
HIV infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce.06
Therefore, women inmates of childbearing age may be able to claim
the protection of the ADA based on a claim similar to that in
Bragdon. Women who are infertile or are not of childbearing age,
however, may not be helped by the decision. These women inmates
will have to demonstrate that their HIV infection substantially
limits some other major life activity.01
Although the Court in Bragdon did not address the other two
definitions of "disability," Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurring
opinion that the third prong of the definition of disability, that the
individual is perceived as having a disability, may be the real basis
for a finding that HIV is a per se disability.0 ' As discussed above,
the third definition of the word "disability" is designed to protect
individuals from the myths and fears associated with disabilities.0 9
Although the parties briefed the meaning of this third definition,
the Bragdon Court did not consider its application. By neglecting
the third definition, the Court did not address whether the negative
treatment that people experience is, in fact, the essence of what
defines a disability that triggers the protections against discrimina-
tion. For inmates who cannot make a claim that their HIV
infection substantially limits their reproductive ability, this third
prong of the disability definition may. afford them protection under
the ADA.
305. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-3S.
306. See id.
307. Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion in Bragdon, points out that there
may be many types of activities that are significantly impacted by HIV. As he stated, "had
different parties brought the suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes
substantial limitations on other major life activities." Id. at 637. Justice Ginsburg, who
wrote a concurring opinion, listed many activities that she found to be significantly impacted
by HIV. For example, she noted that HIV "inevitably pervades life's choices: education,
employment, family and financial undertakings. It affects the need for and ... the ability
to obtain health care because of the reaction of others to the impairment." Id. at 656
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). According to Justice Ginsburg, these problems affect the ability
of one to care for oneself, one of the definitions of "major life activity." See id. Still, it is
unclear from the opinion how far the Court will go in identifying "major life activities."
308. See id. at 656 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 299-301.
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B. What "Reasonable Accommodations" Will Prisons Be
Required to Make?
A second issue is how the ADA will be applied in the prison
setting--especially with respect to the requirement that prisons
provide reasonable accommodations to inmates with disabilities so
that they can participate in all prison programs. The ADA defines
a "'qualified individual with a disability'" as "an individual who,
with or without reasonable modification to rules, policies, or
practices ... or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets
the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services of
the participation in programs or activities."31 ° Therefore, any
inmate who satisfies the eligibility requirements of a prison
program, with or without accommodation, should be allowed to
participate in such a program.In Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections,"' the court
stated that there were several possible defenses that a prison might
raise in response to an ADA complaint. Prisons may claim that no
.reasonable accommodation exists or that a requested accommoda-
tion poses an undue burden on the prison system.31 2 The court
suggested that these defenses to implementation of an accommoda-
tion may be less stringent to meet in a prison, stating that "terms
like 'reasonable' and 'undue' are relative to circumstances, and the
circumstances of a prison are different from those of a school, an
office, or a factory."313
In fact, the Supreme Court made a similar conclusion in
relation to a prisoner's constitutional right to marry in Turner v.
Safley.314 In Turner the Court set forth a four-part reasonableness
test that weighed a prisoner's constitutional right to marry against
the prison's interests in prison management.3 5 The factors
considered by the Court gave deference to a prison's strong interest
in security.31 Therefore, the Court acknowledged that reasonable-
ness may depend on the circumstances and that the scope of
prisoners' rights may be diminished while they are incarcerated.
Because the same interests are present in the application of the
ADA to prisons, it is possible that a similar conclusion may be
310. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1999).
311. 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
312. See id. at 487.
313. Id.
314. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
315. See id. at 84-91.
316. See id.
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reached. While the ADA is applicable in prisons, a prison's interest
in legitimate security issues may well outweigh the statutory rights
of some disabled prisoners to participate in certain programs.
With respect to mental health services, the ADA generally does
not create any new right to the provision of additional services.
HIV-positive women inmates, however, would have to be given an
opportunity to participate in any programs or services already
provided by the prison. Prisons could not deny women inmates
access to those programs because of their HIV infection. Therefore,
if a prison chooses to offer vocational programs, educational
programs, or other supportive programs, women infected with HIV
could not be denied access pursuant to the ADA. Although Yeskey
resolved an important issue by holding that the ADA applied to
prisons,317 it did not create a new cause of action for demanding
mental health services not already provided by the particular prison
system.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRISONS TREATING THE MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS OF HIV-POsITIE WOMEN PRISONERS
The interventions outlined above, psychotherapy, counseling,
and participation in self-help and support groups, are recommended
treatment at all stages of HIV disease.318 These interventions have
been proven effective in decreasing the mental suffering commonly
found in women who are HIV-positive.319 Will prisons be required
to provide these mental health services in order to meet constitu-
tional standards and satisfy the requirements of the ADA given the
definitions of "deliberate indifference" and "serious need" set out in
Estelle v. Gamble?2 In order to require that a particular mental
health intervention be offered, it is imperative to show that the
psychological problem to be addressed constitutes a serious need.321
Therefore, it is essential for HIV-positive women inmates to
demonstrate that the neuropsychological problems they suffer are
serious in nature and that needless suffering will occur unless each
need is addressed by appropriate mental health services.
Because a proper course of treatment depends on accurate
diagnosis, all prisons will be required to have a system for initially
screening female inmates for HIV-related neuropsychological
317. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998).
318. See supra notes 115-56 and accompanying text.
319. See id.
320. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
321. See supra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
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illnesses and for monitoring them at reasonable intervals. 22 As
discussed above, psychological assessment, including interviews
and testing, is critical to distinguish neurological disorders from
psychological disturbances in order to provide appropriate treat-
ment.3 23 Yet, because there is no professional consensus at this
time as to which battery of tests should be used, 24 the type and
manner of testing will most likely be left up to the professional
judgment of the prison's own mental health professionals. In any
case, some basic system of initial screening and follow-up monitor-
ing is essential to adequate care and will be required to meet
constitutional minima. Furthermore, staff administering diagnostic
screening should be trained adequately to identify problems that
may be early signs of HIV-associated mental illness.325
Once mental health problems are diagnosed, whether the
prison system is required to address them depends on the serious-
ness of the problem. It seems clear that AIDS dementia complex
and delirium would be regarded as serious mental health needs.3 26
As described above, dementia is characterized by mild to severe
cognitive impairment with incoherence, psychosis, and/or aggres-
sive outbursts occurring at the later stages of the illness.327
Delirium, though a temporary disturbance, may also be character-
ized by incoherence and loss of contact with reality.3 21 Courts have
held that a psychological problem in which the inmate has "lost
contact with reality" was a serious mental health need that had to
be addressed by the prison system.329 Additionally, courts have
found that suicidal ideation is a serious mental health need.33 °
Therefore, it is likely that prisons will have to provide, mental
health services to address the needs of HIV-positive female inmates
suffering from ADC and delirium and for those inmates who have
been identified as suicidal. The more'difficult question is whether
prisons will be required to provide services to address depression
and other mood disorders that are common in women with HIV
infection.
322. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 115-56 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
325. See MUKAND, supra note 46, at 231-34 (discussing the HIV screening process).
326. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that a prison's
failure to respond to certain psychiatric conditions which accompany HIV infection, including
dementia, could be grounds for an Eighth Amendment claim).
327. See supra text accompanying note 62.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
329. See Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1043 (D.S.D. 1984).
330. See id.
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At least one court specifically found that "mere statements" of
depression did not rise to the level of "serious medical need."331 In
Peterkin v. Jeffes, however, the Court found that depression and
anxiety experienced by death row inmates did rise to the level of
serious need. s32 Like death row inmates, inmates who are HIV-
positive commonly experience chronic depression and anxiety.
333
In Harris v. Thigpen,334 the court specifically addressed the
HIV-positive inmate's need for counseling to better cope with issues
of "death, depression, despair and stigmatization."335 The court
rejected these psychological problems as "serious needs."336
Although the court found that the claim for services for depression
was not frivolous or unsympathetic, it was beyond the basic services
mandated by the Eighth Amendment.337
It is therefore critical for inmates to make a sufficient case for
the seriousness of these needs. The illness must go beyond "mere
depression" and rise to the level of chronic depression before the
prison will have to address it. If this can be shown, then, like death
row inmates, the HIV-positive inmate's needs will rise to the level
of "serious mental health needs" and will be constitutionally
recognized.
Assuming mood disorders are recognized as serious needs,
what level of services will be mandated? As it is well established
that medication can be an effective means of addressing many of
the neuropsychological problems associated with HIV infection,
prisons will need to have at least a part-time, on-site psychiatrist
to diagnose the need, prescribe medication, and manage and
monitor the inmate taking medication. Courts have held that
although medication cannot be a substitute for psychotherapy,
where it is necessary to relieve symptoms of mental illness the
prison is required to have a psychiatrist on-site to manage the
patient.338
Individual psychotherapy is also an important element of a
mental health program for women who are HIV positive. Courts
have held that there must be an adequate number of staff to
provide meaningful access to counseling.339 Therefore, prisons will
331. See Partee v. Lane, 528 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (N.D. I1. 1981).
332. See Peterkin v. Jeffes, 661 F. Supp. 895, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 67-94.
334. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
335. Id. at 1511.
336. See id. at 1510.
337. See id. at 1511.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 215-31.
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need to provide a certain number of counselors who have been
trained in HIV counseling and who are also able to identify early
signs of mental disorders, including ADC.
Behavior modification is another tool that has proven helpful
in treatment of women suffering from HIV-related neuro-psycholog-
ical problems. Behavioral techniques range from simply structur-
ing a patient's day and routinizing everyday tasks to establishing
full programs that teach relaxation techniques and coping skills.
Courts generally have held that most rehabilitation programs
aimed at improving quality of life are not constitutionally man-
dated. 340 To the extent this type of intervention is seen as "self-
esteem building," it is likely that behavior modification programs
are not constitutionally required. However, to the extent that these
programs are effective in reducing aggressive behavior and/or
behaviors leading to possible suicide, they may be required. Courts
often have mandated intervention for such behaviors for the safety
of the disturbed inmate as well as the safety of others.341
The literature confirms the crucial need for support groups and
peer therapy groups to address the unique feelings of isolation and
social ostracism common among persons with HIV infection. If
women inmates could demonstrate that there is an identifiable
population of HIV-positive inmates in need of support groups to
address chronic feelings of depression and anxiety, prisons may
have to provide this service as a means to address that need.
Feelings of isolation and unavailability of social support have been
shown to be predictors of suicidal behavior.3 2 If it could be
demonstrated that support groups would be effective in reducing
the risk of suicide, prisons may be required to provide them as well.
Currently peer counseling or support groups are offered in only
35% of the state and federal prisons.' The ACE (AIDS Counseling
and Education) program at Bedford Hills, New York, the Massachu-
setts Women's prison, and the Arkansas Women's prison all have
provided extensive support group therapy that has been very
successful for HIV-positive women inmates.344 Some prisons,
however, have safety regulations that create obstacles to peer
support groups. For example, some prisons have prohibitions
against group meetings without an officer being present.345 This
340. See Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 156 (D. Colo. 1980).
341. See Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1043 (D.S.D. 1984).
342. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
343. See HAMMETT ETAL., supra note 33, at 30.
344. See HAMMETr ET AL., supra note 16, at 38-39.
345. See id. at 72.
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may have a chilling effect on the women inmates' verbalization of
their feelings and may create confidentiality problems as well.346
Courts generally uphold regulations that are reasonably related to
a safety concern.34 In balancing the inmate's right to mental
health services and the safety concern surrounding group meetings,
courts may hold that the safety concern outweighs the need for the
group therapy. Yet, in a system with such a regulation, it might be
possible to establish the support group with a specially trained
correctional officer as the facilitator in order to satisfy both needs.38
Though the Yeskey case made it clear that the ADA applies to
state prisons, the ADA only mandates equal treatment and
nondiscrimination against persons with disabilities. Once a prison
offers certain services or programs, the ADA would prohibit a
prison system from denying access to these programs to women
because of their HIV infection. The ADA, however, does not
mandate that any particular programs or services be provided. To
the extent that prisons offer programs, HIV infected women
inmates must be reasonably accommodated so that they too can
enjoy the benefits of those programs and services.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the incidence of AIDS and HIV continues to increase,
prisons must create a plan to address the unique mental health
challenges presented by HIV infected women inmates. Although
many of the mental health needs of these women are similar to
other female inmates, increasing numbers of HIV-positive women
inmates who experience various stages of depression, anxiety, AIDS
dementia complex, and delirium will continue to develop to an
extent that prisons are not currently equipped to handle.
To meet their needs and to adhere to constitutional standards,
certain elements will be required in any prison mental health
program. There must be an adequate system for screening in-
coming women inmates to identify HIV-related neuropsychological
346. See id.
347. See generally Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (limiting First Amendment rights
of inmate-to-inmate correspondence by regulation reasonably related to legitimate security
concerns); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding a cell search rule in deference to
security concerns); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (restricting visitation is permissible
because it is reasonably related to security). But see generally Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (limiting security concerns regarding
prisoners' forming of union in deference to First Amendment rights).
348. See HAMMETrETAL., supra note 16, at 40 (describing HIV/AIDS education program
established by corrections officer).
258 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:215
disorders. A system for monitoring inmates after entry to identify
new problems or assess the progression of already identified
illnesses must also be in place. An accurate record keeping system
is essential to ensure continuity of care. On-site psychiatric care
should be provided to assess the need for medication and to manage
those patients on medication. Adequate access to individual
psychotherapy also should be provided. Behavior modification
programs may be constitutionally required, at least to address
behavioral problems that create a safety concern. Though support
groups and peer therapy groups have been shown to be crucial to
the psychological well-being of women infected with HIV, unless
properly characterized and supported through expert testimony,
these services may not be constitutionally required. If inmates can
show that there is an identifiable population of HIV infected women
inmates with chronic depression or anxiety that could be most
appropriately addressed by support or peer groups, courts may
require this intervention. In most cases courts probably will see
support groups as beyond the basic care anticipated by the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The
success and cost effectiveness of peer group therapy, however,
should appeal to prison administrators. Peer groups are less costly
to establish and maintain than traditional programs that employ
outside professionals.
Regardless of the type of therapy being provided, there must be
access to confidential space for such therapy. Staff responsible for
screening and monitoring inmates must be adequately trained to
identify and assess HIV-related mental illness and must be trained
in HIV counseling and in recognizing the early signs of HIV-related
neuropsychological problems.
Finally, for those women who are very ill and pose no threat to
society, states should consider passing early release statutes so that
critically ill women inmates can return to their homes or be placed
in a long term care setting. Most prisons are not equipped to deal
with a large number of HIV infected inmates who present severe,
chronic, psychiatric disturbances such as dementia. Though prisons
can and should provide adequate mental health services, at some
point it is simply more humane to allow those who pose no threat
to society to be released to a more appropriate setting for care.
